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SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF JOINT VENTURE TERMINATION:
A TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS
Managing joint venture (IV) transitions can have implications for parent firm performance as Ns become
important, albeit temporary, instruments of firms' corporate and international strategies. This study examines the
average shareholder wealth effects of five specific types of N termination. Empirical evidence from U.S. firms
terminating domestic and international Ns reveals venture termination neither positively nor negatively influences
firm value on average, and no one type of N termination is superior to its alternatives in general. While N
termination is predominantly achieved by equity transfers between parent firms, acquiring firms do not
systematically gain at the expense of selling firms or vice-versa. A transaction cost perspective is used to examine
cross-sectional differences in firms' abnormal returns and identify contexts in which N internalization and N
withdrawal enhance or destroy firm value. The results provide support for a more constructive, contingency-based
perspective on IV termination.
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INTRODUCTION
As joint ventures (Ns) become increasingly important to firms' international and corporate strategies,
managing N evolution and termination will be significant organizational concerns in coming years. How Ns
evolve, adapt, and terminate are relevant strategy issues as they affect organizational boundaries, corporate resource
allocation and development, and potentially firm performance. At present, however, little is known about N
evolution and termination (Doz, 1996), and even less is known about how post-formation N investment decisions
affect parent firm performance.
A need thus exists to develop and test theoretical perspectives on N evolution and termination that directly
incorporate parent firm performance. International management and strategy scholars have traditionally assumed N
longevity is indicative of collaborative success and JV termination reflects failure by the venture or parent firms.!
This assumption is also implicit in recent N research using longitudinal models of N survival.2 By moving beyond
these assumptions to directly examine firms' post-formation N investment decisions and their performance
consequences, N research can ultimately determine the significance of N evolution and appropriate managerial
actions.
This paper investigates the parent firm performance implications of five specific types of N termination.
From a broader perspective, the study also responds to recent calls for research on the evolution of governance
structures and the multinational firm (e.g., Dunning, 1988; Williamson, 1992, 1993). A transaction cost economics
(TCE) lens is used to evaluate cross-sectional differences in parent firm performance effects of N termination.
Transaction cost theory has been one of the main paradigms used to study the multinational corporation (MNC) and
has proven useful in empirically explaining the adoption of Ns over alternative modes of entering foreign markets.
Use of the transaction cost benchmark therefore encourages comparative theoretical and empirical research on N
formation and termination.
Transaction cost theory would suggest firms' boundary decisions influence performance (e.g., Shelanski &
Klein, 1995; Spiller, 1985), yet TCE has contributed little to understanding how Ns evolve or affect parent firm
performance. This partially reflects theorists' use of selection-based logic and empirical analyses examining the
connection between theoretically optimal governance structures and transactional attributes evaluated at the time of
market entry.3 Widespread N instability raises the question of whether the match between the governance structure
in place and transactional attributes is adequate during the venture's evolution. In principle, potential misalignments
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could be rectified by altering the on-going JV'sgovernance structure or terminating the venture altogether in favor of
a different governance structure. For the purposes of the present study, the issue is whether the gains or losses firms
obtain from altering a governance structure reflect post-formation transactional features and the context of exchange.
The paper begins by highlighting extant research on JV formation and JV instability. A subsequent section
develops the hypotheses identifying potential sources of shareholder wealth creation and destruction from JV
termination. Sections presenting the event study methodology and results fol1ow. Empirical evidence suggests JV
termination neither enhances nor impairs shareholder wealth on average, no single mode of JV termination is
general1y more attractive than its alternatives, and acquiring firms do not regularly gain at the expense of sel1ing
firms or vice-versa. However, just as JV termination adversely affects parent firms in some circumstances, venture
termination can also be value-enhancing for parent firms in specific contexts identified by transaction cost theory.
The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the results and possible avenues for future JV research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on JVs and other strategic alliances has become large and fragmented during the last decade.
The most substantial body of work examines the antecedents of JV formation and the unique properties of JVs
relative to alternative governance choices such as acquisitions or contractual arrangements. The literature review
presented below focuses on event studies of JV formation and complementary research on JV instability. The former
stream on research investigates the ex ante performance implications of JV formation and the mechanisms of firm
value creation or destruction. This stream of research is relevant for historical and comparative reasons, yet does not
consider post-formation events or investment decisions. Joint venture instability research, by contrast, identifies
sources of JV instability, but does not directly address the performance effects of JV instability.
Event Studies of Joint Venture Formation
Early JV event studies emphasized the similarities and differences between JVs and mergers. The first
study was by McConnel1 and Nimtel1 (1985), who argued JVs and mergers are subject to similar formation motives.
The authors found that two-day excess returns from JV formation, scaled by the firm's market value and the
investment size, provided a premium of 0.23. which is comparable to premiums for mergers and tender offers.
Subsequent work sought to theoretically and empirical1y identify the sources of value creation. Woolridge
and Snow (1990) reported JVs formed to share assets yielded higher abnormal returns than R&D ventures and JVs
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formed to construct assets. Koh and Venkatraman (1991) viewed Ns in relation to the fIrm's product-market scope
(Ansoff, 1965). They observed higher abnormal returns when the N operated in the same industry as the parent fIrm
and when the JV was formed between related parent fIrms (c.f., Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). Madhavan and
Prescott (1995) examined stock analysts' influence on market reactions to N formation announcements. Applying
information processing theory from psychology, they noted abnormal returns from JV formation were larger in
industries with light or heavy information loads rather than moderate loads.
International joint venture (IN) research is less conclusive regarding the average performance effects of
venture formation. These equivocal fIndings may be partially due to cultural, })olitical, and other unique challenges
fIrms face in implementing cross-border ventures. Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers (1986) reported the average stock
mar~et reaction to IN formation announcements was not signifIcantly different from zero. Lee and Wyatt (1990)
observed a negative average abnormal return, which they conjectured was a manifestation of agency problems.
Average shareholder wealth effects from IN formation were negative when partners were from developed and
newly-industrialized nations and insignifIcant when partners were from less-developed countries (c.f., Chung,
Koford, & Lee, 1993). Lummer and McConnell (1990) noted excess returns from IN formation were larger when
the partner was a fIrm instead of a government and its capital market was less highly correlated with the U.S. market.
A fInal group of event studies focused on individual host countries. Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991)
investigated Chinese-U.S. ventures in China and found a positive average abnormal return. Firm valuation effects
from JV formation were larger for smaller investments, but were not related to experience in Far East markets and
parent size. Another study found abnormal returns were larger for firms with less international involvement (Hu,
Chen, & Shieh, 1992). Gupta et al. (1991) reported abnormal returns from Ns in China were larger for U.S. fIrms
with small market shares, low capital intensity, and high technological intensity. Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991)
observed gains from forming Japanese-U.S. ven'tures were larger when a strong home currency at the time of market
entry increases the attractiveness of foreign direct investment over exporting.
Joint Venture Instability
Franko's (1971) pioneering study of JV instability examined how changes in a MNC's international
strategy, as proxied by shifts in organizational structure, affected the fIrm's tolerance for the shared control and
decision-making required by Ns. For example, firms had low N instability rates while using an international
division due to the emphasis placed on international expansion, independent subsidiary strategies, and a consultative
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role for the international division. Venture instability counts included three types of N ownership changes: (1)
increasing a parent firm's ownership stake above 95 percent, (2) crossing the 50-50 ownership boundary, and (3)
selling or liquidating the N. By contrast, N instability was highest for non-diversified, centralized firms using an
area-functional structure. Joint venture instability was also commonly brought about by the standardization of
marketing policies or rationalization of production. Franko's (1971) research therefore established that N s are
distinctively transitional phenomena. Venture instability appears to be a function of the firm's evolving global
strategy and supporting structure rather than the failure or success of individual Ns alone.
Subsequent research examined the instability of individual Ns rather than corporate level changes in
venture portfolios. Berg and Friedman's (1978) exploratory study of chemical Ns in the U.S. found diverse reasons
for N termination, ranging from obsolete facilities to antitrust settlements to new investment opportunities. Killing
(1983) reported that shared management Ns, ventures to which both parent firms contribute managers and over
which the N's board exerts significant influence, were more likely to "fail" (i.e., terminate or undergo
reorganization) than JVs with a dominant parent firm. Beamish (1985) extended this work to the developing host
country context and found even higher N instability rates (i.e., 56-58 percent versus 45-50 percent for Ns in
developing and developed host countries, respectively). H~gan (1988) noted differences in parents' nationalities,
activities, asset bases, and N experience levels reduced N lifespans.
Other N research provided historical accounts of subsidiary ownership patterns and host countries'
policies. Gomes-Casseres (1987) reported 26.9 percent of majority-owned INs established between 1900 and 1975
became wholly-owned subsidiaries by 1975. Parents contributing technology or maintaining more control over the
N through a larger equity stake were more likely to buyout the N partner (Blodgett, 1991). Ventures operating in
countries with open investment climates were more apt to undergo incremental changes in ownership by parent firms
(Blodgett, 1992). Reynolds (1979) investigated U.S. firms' withdrawal from Ns in India in the late 1960s as the
Indian government called for more local R&D, less foreign ownership, and greater exports by JVs. The movement
toward minority Ns in the 1970s was concentrated in five LDCs with activist local ownership policies (i.e., Brazil,
India, Iran, Mexico, and the Philippines) (Franko, 1989), while the proportion of U.S. firms' minority and 50-50
affiliates decreased in most countries during the late 1970s and early 1980s due to host governments' liberalizing
investment policies (Contractor, 1990). Collectively these findings indicate shifts in general subsidiary ownership
patterns reflect firms' responses to changing host country policies regarding inbound foreign investment.
6
The most recent N instability research has become more deductive and technical in orientation. Kogut's
(1989, 1991) research examined determinants of N termination using multivariate survival analyses of N
termination. For example, the likelihood of N dissolution is lower when the N conducts R&D activities in an R&D
intensive industry (Kogut, 1989). Using a real options view of Ns, he later found the likelihood of N acquisition
increases with unexpected growth in industry demand (Kogut, 1991). Pennings, Barkema, and Douma (1994) used
an organizational learning perspective to study the survival of firms' market entries. Unrelated, non-majority owned,
and start-up projects subject to greater learning obstacles experienced reduced longevity (see also Li, 1995). A
separate study reported national culture differences increased the likelihood of termination (Barkema, Bell, &
Pennings, 1996). Park and Russo (1996) noted the likelihood of "failure" (i.e., N dissolution) was higher for N s
between direct competitors and for Ns not supported by other Ns between the parent firms.
The literature review has two main implications for this study. First, a developing literature exists
investigating the ex ante performance of Ns, and this stream of research has begun to identify the mechanisms
underlying firm value creation through forming Ns. Little is known about the performance implications of post-
formation events and decisions, however. Second, complementary research has identified factors destabilizing Ns,
but N instability has been defined in various ways, N instability types have been aggregated together in theoretical
and empirical work, and N instability is commonly assumed to adversely affect parent firm performance. In fact, N
termination may be value-enhancing in specific firm, N, and environmental contexts, and different N instability
types may have different performance implications for parent firms.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Transaction cost analyses of firms' boundary decisions generally examine the effects of a variety of
transactional features, most importantly asset specificity (Riordan & Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1985), on firms'
governance choices. The theory contends firms making appropriate governance decisions will experience lower
transaction costs and thus better performance. The selection-based reasoning suggests firms making inappropriate
governance choices (i.e., selecting governance structures ill-suited to transactional attributes and the broader
exchange context) will be quickly weeded out by market mechanisms. As a consequence, empirical tests focus on
the relationship between transactional features and governance choices at the time of market entry.
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The hypotheses and empirical analyses that follow relax the standard selection-based approach. If firms' N
termination decisions are viewed as post-formation governance choices, then the mode of N termination, taken
together with the transactional features and exchange context at the time of N termination, should affect firms'
performance outcomes, which are explicitly considered here. In particular, this study draws on international
applications of transaction cost theory (see Caves, 1996 and Shelanski & Klein, 1995 for reviews) identifying firm,
JV, and environmental factors that may influence the firm's abnormal returns from N termination.
Know-How Resources and Requirements
Firms' know-how resources can affect the gains or losses from N termination for two main reasons. First,
TCE submits that the specificity of an asset is a function of the knowledge embedded in the asset. Firms with
significant know-how resources therefore expand using high control governance structures to ameliorate possible
hold-up problems (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978), difficulties which do not materialize in the absence of asset
specificity. Given a positive theoretical relationship between asset specificity and control, the performance effects of
changing a venture's ownership structure through N internalization or N withdrawal will therefore depend on asset
specificity levels. Second, control problems can arise in the N context when a parent firm simultaneously attempts
to acquire a partner's know-how while protecting its own resources that are difficult to value (Hamel, 1991). Unlike
wholly-owned subsidiaries, Ns offer less protection against know-how leakage or direct appropriation by
competitors. For these reasons, R&D intensive firms tend to be vertically integrated (Levy, 1984), prefer wholly-
owned subsidiaries (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Stopford & Wells, 1972), and engage in less
divestiture activity (Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994). Multinational firms with significant R&D resources tend
to employ their proprietary knowledge in subsidiaries that the firm controls completely (Davidson & McFetridge,
1985; Davies, 1977; Hennart, 1982, 1989).
The above research suggests firms with substantial R&D resources to contribute to a N have stronger
incentives to internalize a N than firms with less significant technological know-how resources. Just as R&D
intensive firms tend to gain more from international acquisitions than firms with less R&D resources (Morek &
Yeung, 1992), the same pattern should hold for firms gaining complete control of ajointly-owned business. As a
corollary, firms with substantial R&D resources are more apt to be adversely affected by N termination when the
firm does not maintain control over the JV's activities and the firm's know-how contributions. As Williamson
8
observed, "asset specificity is apt either to be sacrificed and transactions moved to the market, or if asset specificity
is preserved (or deepened), transactions will be moved to unified governance" (1988: 360).
Hla: The acquiring firm's abnormal returns from JV internalization will be positively related to the
acquiring firm's R&D intensity.
Hlb: The withdrawing firm's abnormal returns from JV withdrawal will be negatively related to the
withdrawing firm's R&D intensity.
Parent firms' intangible resources subject to transactional hazards extend beyond technological know-how
to include marketing-based intangible assets (Hennart, 1991). For example, transaction-specific human capital in a
N is likely to be significant for the firm with marketing intensive products requiring more complex partner
interactions (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Greater control over subsidiaries is also required to reduce hazards of
free-riding on a parent firm's brand name developed through cumulative marketing efforts (Hennart, 1991).
Advertising intensive MNCs therefore exhibit a greater proclivity toward using wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries
over alternative entry modes (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995; Stopford & Wells, 1972).
Transaction cost theory thus submits that the firm's marketing-based intangible resources affect the attractiveness of
alternative ownership structures in a similar manner as the firm's R&D resources. Hence:
H2a: The acquiring firm's abnormal returns from JV internalization will be positively related to the
acquiring firm's advertising intensity.
H2b: The withdrawing firm's abnormal returns from JV withdrawal will be negatively related to the
withdrawing firm's advertising intensity.
Parent firms' resource contributions to a N can also be inferred from the venture's resource requirements,
as proxied by the N's industry of operation. Previous research has found N s are prevalent in natural resource-
based manufacturing industries (e.g., Stuckey, 1983), which generally require less complex know-how contributions
by parent firms. For instance, Gomes-Casseres (1989) reported U.S. MNCs' foreign subsidiaries in natural resource-
based manufacturing industries are more than twice as likely to be Ns compared to affiliates in other industries.
Hennart (1991) observed a similar pattern for Japanese MNCs investing in the U.S. market. Since Ns in natural
resource-based manufacturing industries involve less complex know-how contributions by parent firms, gains from
acquiring complete control via N internalization are apt to be lower than for ventures in other industry contexts.
Conversely, firms withdrawing from Ns in natural resource-based manufacturing industries may sacrifice less asset
specificity compared to N withdrawals in other industries. The following hypotheses result:
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H3a: The acquiring firm's abnormal returns from jV internalization will be lower for JVs in natural
resource-based manufacturing industries than for jVs in other manufacturing industries.
H3b: The withdrawing firm's abnormal returns from JV withdrawal will be higher for jVs in natural
resource-based manufacturing industries than for jVs in other manufacturing industries.
Cultural Distance and International Experience
Transaction cost theory suggests transfers of tacit knowledge from an MNC to its affiliate will be difficult
and costly when the affiliate operates in a host country that is culturally distant from the MNC's home country. For
instance, as cultural distance increases, transaction costs can increase because of higher communication costs
resulting from encoding and decoding gaps in languages (Root, 1987). By using weaker forms of integration in
culturally distant markets, the firm can reduce governance costs by passing on the responsibility for tailoring
marketing and other business practices to a local firm (e.g., Anderson & Gatignon, 1986).
Empirical research on MNCs finds a negative relationship between cultural distance and subsidiary control.
Kogut and Singh (1988) observed U.S. MNCs enter culturally distant markets via UVs rather than wholly-owned
subsidiaries. Similarly, Gatignon and Anderson (1988) reported U.S. firms tend to use partially-owned subsidiaries
in Latin European countries after accounting for other ownership influences. In culturally distant host countries,
firms also prefer licensing agreements (Davidson & McFetridge, 1985) or franchising agreements (Fladmoe-
Lindquist & Jacque, 1995) over wholly-owned subsidiaries. Research on cross-border acquisitions reports gains to
acquiring firms are negatively related to national culture differences (e.g., Datta & Puia, 1995).
Situated in the middle of the governance structure continuum, the JV's equilibrium is sensitive to external
and internal disturbances making market- or hierarchy-based exchange more efficient (Williamson, 1991). Cultural
differences and lack of trust can prompt contractual renegotiations, thereby undermining the initial basis for
collaboration (Beamish & Banks, 1987). Venture longevity is therefore generally lower when the N operates in a
culturally distant home country (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996). Governance costs can also be adversely affected
by cultural differences causing parent firms to falsely attribute partner behavior as opportunistic (Brown, Rugman, &
Verbeke, 1989). Harrigan and Newman (1990) propose foreign N s are more likely to be spun off rather than
absorbed compared to domestic Ns because geographic and cultural distances limit the coordination benefits that
internal organization would otherwise afford the firm.
84a: The acquiring firm's abnormal returns from JV internalization will be negatively related to the
cultural distance between the U.S. and the JV's host country.
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U4b: The withdrawing firm's abnormal returns from JV withdrawal will be positively related to the
cultural distance between the U.S. and the JV's host country.
Similarly, firms lacking international experience are apt to be unable to commit to stand-alone operations in
unfamiliar markets (e.g., Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Relative governance costs for
wholly-owned units in foreign markets can be reduced, however, as the firm gains experience in serving that
particular market or other international markets. Further, the knowledge that develops from international operations
has a large experiential component, so intrafirm transfers of such knowledge can take place with greater efficiency
than transfers across firm boundaries. Hence, firms with experience in a particular country exhibit a preference for
wholly-owned entries (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991) and give greater priority to projects in that
country (Davidson, 1980). Gatignon and Anderson (1988) found that firms with more foreign market entries favor
complete ownership for individual subsidiaries. Firms with less international involvement tend to gain more from
establishing Ns instead (e.g., Hu, Chen, & Shieh, 1992). Other research presents less consistent results regarding
the relationship between MNCs' international experience and their governance structure choices (e.g., Erramilli,
1991; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1995; Kogut & Singh, 1988).
The development of experience in the host market or other countries can make stand-alone operation
through N internalization feasible (Beamish & Inkpen, 1995). Venture internalization may be attractive if such
knowledge reduces post-acquisition integration or global coordination costs or promotes greater commitments of
transaction-specific assets that the JV cannot adequately safeguard. Such benefits may be forgone by experienced
firms withdrawing from international Ns to which specialized assets have been contributed.
U5a: The acquiring firm's abnormal returns from JV internalization will be positively related to the
acquiring firm's international experience.
U5b: The withdrawing firm's abnormal returns from JV withdrawal will be negatively related to the
withdrawing firm's international experience.
Political Risk
While JV internalization can mitigate risks of knowledge appropriation or free-riding by partners, altering
JV ownership can also change the firm's exposure to other risks. Just as cultural differences or inexperience in
international markets may affect the attractiveness of changing host market commitments through shifting JV
ownership, political risks may influence firms' performance outcomes from JV internalization or JV withdrawal.
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Political risk is a multidimensional concept referring to possible effects of a host country's policy
restrictiveness and political change (e.g., Fitzpatrick, 1983; Kobrin, 1982). Ownership restrictions influence the
feasible set of subsidiary ownership structures, so policy shifts trigger changes in subsidiary ownership patterns
(Contractor, 1990; Franko, 1989). Other political risks involving changes in a country's political regime, operational
constraints, and policies surrounding financial transfers also affect optimal ownership structures since governance
forms involving progressively greater integration are more sensitive to such risks (Teece, 1986). For instance, in
comparison with Ns relying on local partners, wholly-owned subsidiaries involve a direct connection between the
MNC and host government. Not having a local firm to buffer the MNC from the host government increases the
likelihood the committed MNC will be held-up by the host government.
Empirical research finds a negative relationship between political risk and subsidiary control (e.g., Gatignon
& Anderson, 1988). Kim and Hwang (1992) reported firms prefer licensing agreements over INs and wholly-
owned subsidiaries in high risk countries. Restrictive host government policies regarding the repatriation of
dividends, fees, and royalties increase the likelihood a service firm will enter a foreign market with a franchising
agreement rather than a wholly-owned direct investment (Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995). The host country's
political context should similarly influence firms' abnormal returns from N internalization and N withdrawal as
such ownership changes involve changes in the firm's commitment to the host market.
H6a: The acquiring firm's abnormal returns from JV internalization will be negatively related to the host
country's political risk.
H6b: The withdrawing firm's abnormal returns from JV withdrawal will be positively related to the host
country's political risk.
Multiple Parent Firm Linkages
The previous hypotheses consider a single N in isolation from other possible relationships between the
parent firms. However, the presence of other alliances between parent firms creates the potential for spillovers
across alliances. For instance, when other alliances exist, firms can channel rewards and punishments through
multiple relationships to respond to cooperative and competitive behaviors. Such reciprocity creates bilateral
dependence and thus promotes venture longevity (Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996). As a result, venture
safeguards can be greater than features of a single N might otherwise indicate.
The costs of TV termination therefore involve potential repercussions on other alliances with the partner.
For example, if a firm divests one of two N s with a particular partner, the N withdrawal may destabilize the
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remaining JV by changing parents' incentives to continue to devote resources to the venture. The performance effect
of internalizing a JV bundled with other alliances is less certain. Both parent firms may have made significant
transaction-specific commitments to the venture, and these specific resources can be controlled by the firm acquiring
complete ownership of the JV. However, the total shareholder wealth effect of JV internalization may not be
positive if the JV partner buyout ad'versely affects other relationships. Hence, the influence of on-going JVs on
abnormal returns from JV internalization is not specified a priori.
H7: Abnormal returns from JV withdrawal will be lower when parent firms have other on-going JVs
with each other at the time of JV termination.
METHODOLOGY
Sample
Joint venture termination announcements were used to construct the base sample. Searches used Predicast's
Funk and Scott CF&S) Index and Lexis-Nexis' company news library to identify ventures terminating during the
1985-1995 time period. These databases draw upon more than 1,000 and 2,300 sources, respectively.
Three main criteria were applied to screen announcements. First, at least one of the JV's parent firms had
to be a publicly-held, U.S. firm. Second, the JV had to be a separate entity with equity held by two or more parent
firms. This criterion excluded other governance structures such as toe-hold investments and non-equity
collaborations and guaranteed partners were firms rather than public, government, or anonymous investors. Third,
the JV had to terminate from the vantage point of a focal U.S. firm. Announcements were eliminated if they failed to
specify the means by which the venture ended or contained retrospective information.
Five types of JV termination were distinguished, which represent JV internalization or JV withdrawal from
a focal firm's perspective. A focal firm internalized the JV if this parent firm bought out its partner(s) and acquired
the JV. Four alternative types of venture withdrawal were coded. The focal firm can liquidate the JV's assets, sell
its ownership position to the partner(s), sell its individual equity stake to an outside party, or sell the JV in its entirety
to an outside party. In 69 instances more than one firm could be identified as a focal firm within a particular JV, so a
single focal firm was chosen at random in order to eliminate any bias in cross-sectional analyses caused by multiple
sampling on a single JV.
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This procedure generated a base sample of 423 Ns operating in 33 countries and 53 industries (i.e., at the
2-digit SIC level). Approximately half of these ventures (i.e., 51.1 percent) operated within the U.S., and Japan was
the second most common host country with 12.3 percent of the observations. A majority of Ns (i.e., 63.6 percent)
operated in manufacturing industries (i.e., SICs in the 2000-3999 range). Chemicals and Allied Products (i.e., SIC
28) had the largest number of terminated JVs with 20.6 percent of the observations. In 83.2 percent of the cases, the
focal firm either bought out its N partner or sold its stake in the N to its partner(s). The focal firm sold its equity to
an outside party in 8.8 percent of the cases, and parents liquidated N s 8.0 percent of the time. Hence, N
termination is predominantly achieved through N ownership reallocations, and selling out to a partner is the most
common method of JV withdrawal.
Variables and Data Sources
Dependent Variable. The parent firm performance effect of N termination was measured through event
study methodology. This technique captures the parent firm's stock price movement surrounding the JV termination
announcement after adjusting for general stock market movements and the firm's systematic risk. The Sharpe-
Lintner market model was estimated to obtain firm-specific stock returns forecasts:
(I) Rit =<Xj + ~iRml + Eil'
Rit is the return on security i in period t, Rmt is the return on the value-weighted market portfolio, and Eit is the error
term assumed to be distributed N(O, cr) and independent across firms and time. Dailyfirm and market returns data
were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data files. A tradeoff exists between
estimating equation (l) over a long interval to improve the statistical accuracy of parameters versus estimating the
model over a short horizon close to the announcement date in case parameters are unstable. Hence, the chosen
estimation interval was of intermediate length. The trading days used were t =-250 to t =-50, where t =0
corresponds to the date of the JV termination announcement. When multiple announcements appeared for a single
JV termination, the earliest trading day was used for t = O. When the announcement date was not a trading day, the
next available trading day was used. Finally, the observation was deleted if the announcement date could not be
determined to the day or the firm made other information disclosures that might confound the results. For trading
days surrounding the JV termination announcement date, forecasted returns from equation (l) provided the
benchmark for calculating abnormal returns:
14
where aj and biare the firm-specific OLS parameter estimates from equation (1). The total firm valuation effect is
measured by summing abnormal returns between two days t ='t and t =1C surrounding the announcement date:
lC
(3) CARi,t,lC = IARit .
I=t
JV event studies have accumulated abnormal returns for periods up to sixty days in length (e.g., Lee & Wyatt, 1990),
However, for multivariate analyses of CARs it is desirable to use a smaller interval to reduce the amount of noise in
the dependent variable while still capturing differences in price adjustment due to information leakages or delays
(e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 1997), This study used CARj,.2,2 as the estimate of the frrm valuation effect of JV
termination.4
Explanatory Variables. Following previous international research employing TCE (e.g., Hennart, 1991;
Hennart & Park, 1994; Morek & Yeung, 1992), the parent firm's technological and marketing know-how resources
were measured by R&D and advertising outlays, respectively. R&D and advertising intensity variables were
constructed using R&D expense to sales and advertising expense to sales ratios for the year prior to the JV
termination announcement using Compustat data (i.e., R&D and ADV). The binary variable NATRES was coded as
one if the JV operates in a natural resource-based industry (i.e., in SIC 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 30, or 33), and zero
otherwise (Gomes-Casseres, 1989), The variables R&D, ADV, and NATRES were included in models when either
the parent firm or JV operates in a manufacturing industry (i.e., SICs 2000-3999).
Cultural distance was measured in two ways using a weighted index of cultural distance and a categorical
approach. Both techniques have been used in recent analyses ofMNCs' ownership decisions and subsidiary survival
(e.g., Barkerna, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). First,
the weighted index, CD, uses Hofstede's (1980) scales for uncertainty avoidance, individuality, tolerance of power
distance, and masculinity for the U.S. and host countries:
where CDjk is the cultural distance'between countries j (i.e., the U.S.) and k, Iij is the score for country j on scale i, Iik
is the score of country k on scale i, and Vj is the sample variance of scale i (Kogut & Singh, 1988). Second, binary
variables classified JVs into national culture clusters obtained in prior empirical research (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985).
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Since a few clusters had zero or few Ns, and 52 of the 60 "independent" Ns were located in Japan, six binary
variables were constructed to indicate whether or not the N was based in a Far East, Germanic, Latin American,
Latin European, Japanese, or another host country (i.e., FAREAST, GERMANIC, LATINAM, LATINEUR,
JAPAN, and OTHER). When all six indicators are equal to zero, the N operated in an Anglo nation.
International experience was measured using proxies for multinational and country-specific experience.
Multinationality, MULT, is the number of countries in which the furn has direct investments upon N termination
(Caves & Mehra, 1986; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Prior entry, PRIOR, indicates whether or not the firm had entered
the JV's host country with a direct investment prior to the N termination (i.e., PRIOR =1 if yes, 0 otherwise).
Subsidiary data used to construct these proxies were obtained from the Directory of Coworate Affiliations.
Political risk was measured using three variables to capture political change and policy restrictions in the
JV's host country: (1) political turmoil risk, TURMOIL; (2) financial transfer risk, TRANSFER; and (3) investment
restriction risk, INVRST. These proxies were obtained from 18-month forecasts from the Political Risk Service for
the year preceding the N termination announcement. All three variables are reported annually in Planning Review.
Financial transfer and investment risk forecasts are reported on a scale from A+ to D-, and political turmoil risk
forecasts are reported on a scale ranging from "low" to "very high." Following Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque
(1995), transfer and investment risk forecasts were converted to numerical scores on a 0-4 scale, and political turmoil
forecasts were converted to numerical scores on a 1-4 scale.
A binary variable, TIES, indicated whether or not parent firms have other on-going equity JVs at the time of
N termination (Park & Russo, 1996). This variable incorporated equity JVs rather than other alliances since
bilateral dependence and opportunities for reciprocity are likely to be greater for equity Ns, and the use of
announcement searches may miss less significant alliances.
Control Variables. Four types of control variables were used in the analyses. First, host market
attractiveness was included to control for expansion opportunities and the host government's bargaining power (e.g.,
Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990). Market size was measured as the host country's 1990 gross domestic product in U.S.
dollars. Market growth (i.e., GDPGR) was measured as the average annual growth in real GDP for the five year
period preceding the N termination. Data were obtained from the Statistical Yearbook, the World Data database,
and the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the Republic of China. Second, firm size was included as a control since
abnormal returns for an investment decision are expected to be smaller for firms with large operations, holding all
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else constant (e.g., McConnell & Nantell, 1985). LASSET is the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets. Data
for firm size were obtained from Compustat. Third, the firm's pre-termination equity stake, EQUITY, controlled for
the parent firm's ownership change. Kogut's (1991) option model suggests acquisition gains are negatively related
to the firm's pre-acquisition N ownership. Fourth, the N's duration in years, DURATION, was used to control for
IV age (Kogut, 1988b). Data for EQUITY and DURATION were obtained from Lexis-Nexis, the F&S Index, and
the Directol)' of Corporate Affiliations.
Model Specifications
Three separate models were estimated since a subset of the explanatory variables apply to specific ventures
and two techniques were used for modeling the effects of cultural distance. The following model was estimated for
focal firms or Ns operating in manufacturing industries:
(5) CARi.-2.2 = ~o + ~IR&D + ~2ADV + ~3NATRES + ~4TIES + ~5LASSET + ~~QUITY + ~7DURATION + Ej.
For Ns based outside the U.S., two models were used given the two approaches for measuring cultural distance:
(6) CARi ._2,2 = ~o + ~lCD + ~2MULT + ~3PRIOR + ~4TURMOIL + ~5TRANSFER + ~6INVRST + ~7TIES +
~gGDP + ~9GDPGR + ~loLASSET + ~IIEQUITY + ~I2DURATION + Ej,
(7) CARi .-2.2 = ~o + ~IFAREAST + ~2GERMANIC + ~3LATINAM + ~4LATINEUR + ~5IAPAN + ~60THER +
P7MULT + PgPRIOR + ~9TURMOIL + ~lOTRANSFER + PIIINVRST + P12TIES + ~13GDP +
~14GDPGR + ~15LASSET + ~1~QUITY + P17DURATION + Ej,
Models (6) and (7) did not restrict firms or Ns to manufacturing industries. The significance of national culture
differences in equation (7) can be assessed by a hierarchical F-test (i.e., Ho: ~I = ... = ~6 =0). Equations (5) through
(7) were estimated separately for N internalizations and N withdrawals since parameter signs are expected to differ
according to the IV termination mode.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables in equation (5). The large
mean and standard deviation for R&D intensity reflects several observations with values above unity, which were
deleted from the multiple regression analyses. Firms that are R&D intensive generally exercise greater control over
their IVs prior to acquisition through a higher equity stake (p<O.OOI). Ventures in natural resource-based
manufacturing industries tend to be owned by less R&D intensive firms (i.e., t =-2.32, 269 d.f.). This finding
conforms to the observation that parent firms use Ns in such industry contexts due to lesser know-how requirements
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(Gomes-Casseres, 1989). In 15.8 percent of the cases, parent firms had other on-going equity JVs at the time of
venture termination. Consistent with past research reporting path dependence in IV ownership (e.g., Blodgett, 1991;
Gomes-Casseres, 1987), the average pre-termination equity stake is larger for acquiring firms than withdrawing firms
(i.e., t = 3.99, 319 d.f.). The average venture duration is 9.02 years.
===================
Insert Table 1 Here
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables appearing in equations (6)
and (7). The average firm operates in 14.5 countries at the time of JV termination. Firms with greater international
involvement tend to be larger (p<0.05) and have longer-lived ventures (p<O.lO). Approximately half (i.e., 53
percent) of the firms had made a direct investment in the host country before the JV's termination. Host countries
attracting such prior entries are larger (i.e., t = 2.77, 200 d.f.) and have better political risk forecasts (i.e., t = -2.94,
-2.73, and -2.30 for TURMOIL, TRANSFER, and INVRST; 203 dJ.). Host countries with worse political risk
forecasts are those more culturally distant from the U.S. in general. The average 1990 GDP of host countries is
$1.26 trillion, and the average annual growth rate in real GDP is 3.18 percent.
==========
Insert Table 2 Here
===================
Table 3 presents mean abnormal returns from JV internalization and JV withdrawal for trading days
surrounding the announcement date. The firm valuation effect of JV termination, CARi,-2.2, averages 0.66 percent for
JV internalizations and 0.36 percent for JV withdrawals. Both values are insignificant at the 0.10 level. Average
abnormal returns are positive for firms selling JV equity stakes tei partners (i.e., Type II, date t =1, p<O.l 0) or to
outside parties (Le., Type III, date t = 0, p<0.01). By contrast, the mean abnormal return is negative for firms selling
IVs in their entirety to outside parties (i.e., Type IV, date t = I, p<O.l 0), and the mean abnormal return from IV
liquidation is not significantly different from zero (i.e., Type V). However, average CARs for each of the five IV
termination types are not significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level. Results from a one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) indicate average CARs do not differ across the five JV termination types (i.e., F =0.841; 4, 364
d.f.). These findings reveal IV termination neither enhances nor impairs shareholder wealth on average, and no
single IV termination type appears to be more attractive than its alternatives in general.
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=========
Insert Table 3 Here
===================
Domestic, two-parent Ns ending via partner buyout were further investigated to examine possible payoff
differences for acquiring and selling firms within ventures. Stock returns data were available for both parent firms in
42 Ns. Consistent with the above findings, a matched-sample t-test revealed no difference in acquiring and selling
firms' CARs at the 0.10 level (i.e., t =-0.096, 41 d.f.). Hence, acquiring firms do not systematically gain at the
expense of selling firms or vice-versa.
Table 4 presents regression results for model (5). A plot of studentized residuals versus predicted values
provided no evidence ofheteroskedasticity (Fox, 1991), which can be problematic when stock returns forecasts are
use~ to construct a dependent variable for a second stage regression model (Stickel, 1985). Variance inflation
factors (VIFs) were below two for all explanatory variables for the N internalization and N withdrawal ~odels,
providing no evidence of multicollinearity problems (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990). Finally, outliers were
eliminated from the analysis when their DFFlTS values exceeded 2~ in absolute value, where p is the number of
estimated parameters and n is the sample size (Belsey, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). Table 4 presents regression results
after eliminating seven outliers from the N internalization model and nine outliers from the N withdrawal model.
The former model displays satisfactory fit (p<0.OO8), while the latter is only significant at the 0.19 level.
===================
Insert Table 4 Here
=========--=========
Firms' technological know-how resources affect the firms' abnormal returns from N termination. The
focal firm's R&D intensity is positively signed in the N internalization model (p<0.05) and negatively signed in the
JV withdrawal model (p<0.05). Shareholder wealth effects of acquiring a JV and obtaining complete control over
the business are therefore larger for firms with substantial R&D resources relative to firms that do not invest
significantly in R&D. Conversely, CARs from N withdrawal are negatively related to the withdrawing firm's R&D
resources. These results are supportive of Hla and Hlb.
However, firm valuation effects from N termination do not exhibit the same relation with the firm's
marketing-based intangible resources or the N's know-how requirements. The parameter estimate for ADV is
positively signed as anticipated in the N internalization model, but fails to reach significance at the 0.10 level. The
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coefficient on ADV is positive in the N withdrawal model (p<0.1O), which is contrary to expectations. In both
models NATRES is insignificant at the 0.10 level. Whether or not the N operates in a natural resource-based or
other manufacturing industry thus has no bearing on the shareholder wealth effects of N termination. Hence, no
empirical support is evident for the specific hypotheses contained in H2 and H3.
Spillovers across alliances affect the performance outcomes of investment decisions within a particular
collaborative relationship. The coefficient on TIES is positive in the N internalization model (p<0.OO3) and
negative in the IV withdrawal model (p<0.1O), providing support for H7. Having on-going equity Ns with the
partner at the time of venture termination positively affects abnormal returns from acquiring a venture, but such
supporting alliances adversely affect firm value when the parent firm withdraws from one of the Ns.
Firm size, LASSET, is the only significant control variable in the two models. The coefficient for LASSET
is negative in the N internalization model (p<0.05), which indicates larger firms experience smaller abnormal
returns from N partner buyouts. Shareholder wealth effects of IV termination do not appear to be influenced by the
pre-termination equity allocation or venture duration, regardless of the means by which the N terminates.
Table 5 presents multiple regression results for equations (6) and (7). Columns (1) and (2) are for N
internalizations, and columns (3) and (4) are for N withdrawals. Columns (1) and (3) incorporate the weighted
index measure of cultural distance, and columns (2) and (4) employ national culture clusters through six indicator
variables. Inspecting plots of studentized residuals versus predicted values and VIFs again provided no evidence of
heteroskedasticity or multicollinearity. Table 5 presents regression results after eliminating five, four, five, and three
outliers from the four models using the DFFlTS criterion introduced earlier. The models for N internalization
display better fit (p<0.05) than the models for N withdrawal (p<0.21 and p<0.29, respectively).
===================
Insert Table 5 Here
===================
Cultural differences between the focal firm's host country (i.e., the U.S.) and the JV's host country affect
the firm's abnormal returns from JV internalization but not the abnormal returns from N withdrawal, providing
support for H4a but not H4b. The negative coefficient for cultural distance, CD, in column (I) (p<O.10) indicates
CARs from N internalization are lower when the N operates in a host country culturally distant from the U.S. The
hierarchical F-value for the national culture clusters in column (2) was significant at the 0.05 level (i.e., F = 2.593; 6,
50 d.f.). Negative coefficients on FAREAST and LATINEUR (p<O.OI and p<0.05) suggest CARs are lower when
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the parent firm acquires a N in the Far East or in Latin European nations, after controlling for political risk and
other host country conditions. In the N withdrawal models, CD is insignificant and none of the cultural cluster
proxies' coefficients are positive and significant at the 0.10 level.
Multinational experience, MULT, is not significant in any of the four models at the 0.10 level. The focal
firm's multinational experience thus has no bearing on the performance effects of N internalization or N
withdrawal. The parameter estimate for PRIOR is negative in columns (3) and (4), but is significant in column (4)
only (p<O.lO). Hence, firms lacking host country experience through a prior direct investment tend to obtain higher
CARs from N withdrawal than firms with such experience in the N's host country. The negative coefficient for
PRIOR in model (1) (p<0.05) suggests host country experience from prior direct investment entries does not benefit
firms acquiring Ns. Hence, limited empirical support is evident for H5b but not H5a.
Specific dimensions of host country political risk influence the firm valuation effects of N internalization
and N withdrawal, lending support to both H6a and H6b. Political turmoil risk, TURMOIL, is positively signed in
columns (3) and (4) (p<0.10), indicating firms obtain higher CARs when withdrawing from Ns in host countries
subject to significant political turmoil. The coefficient estimate for TURMOIL is negative as expected in columns
(1) and (2), but does not reach significance at the 0.10 level. Financial transfer risk, TRANSFER, is insignificant in
all four models at the 0.10 level. Finally, investment restriction risk, INVRST, has a negative coefficient in model
(2) and is insignificant in the other three models at the 0.10 level. This result indicates shareholder wealth effects of
IV internalization are larger when the N operates in a country with lower risks surrounding investment restrictions.
As earlier, the presence of on-going ventures between parent firms at the time of N termination has a
positive effect on the CARs from N internalization (i.e., p<0.05 for TIES in models (1) and (2)). However, TIES is
insignificant at the 0.10 level in models (3) and (4) for N withdrawal. As such, negative spillovers from N
withdrawal are not apparent for this sample of IVs operating outside of the U.S. Hence, the presence of other on-
going Ns with a partner increases CARs from N internalization, regardless if the IV is located in the U.S. or
abroad. However, the presence of other on-going Ns at the time of venture termination does not adversely affect the
abnormal returns from IV withdrawal as hypothesized if the terminated IV operates outside of the U.S.
The attractiveness of the host country, as proxied by its real growth in GDP, is another contextual factor
affecting firms' gains or losses from IV termination. The positive coefficient for GDPGR in column (2) (p<O.OI)
indicates real growth in the host country is associated with larger CARs when the firm increases its commitment to
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the host country by acquiring the IV. The negative coefficient for GDPGR in column (4) (p<0.05) suggests firms'
CARs from IV withdrawal will be lower when the firm withdraws from rapidly growing host markets as opposed to
countries with lower (or negative) growth rates. By contrast, host market size, GDP, is insignificant at the 0.10 level
in all four models, suggesting the size of the host country's economy has no impact on CARs from IV internalization
or IV withdrawal. The pre-termination equity allocation and the venture's duration are also insignificant at the 0.10
level in all four models. Unlike the negative influence of firm size on CARs reported above, LASSET is
insignificant in all four models at the 0.10 level. In column (1) IV duration is positively signed (p<0.05), providing
tentative evidence that JV internalizations are more attractive for long-lived IVs outside the U.S.
DISCUSSION
This study moves beyond common assumptions in the strategy and international management areas holding
long-lived, stable IVs are in parent firms' interests, while IV termination or instability reflects failure on the part of
the venture or parent firm. Event study methodology permits a direct analysis of the parent firm performance effects
of five types of IV termination. The empirical evidence reveals venture termination neither enhances nor impairs
shareholder wealth in general. Further, no single type of IV termination appears to be more or less attractive than its
four alternatives on average, and firms acquiring IVs do not typically gain at the expense of selling firms or vice-
versa.
The firm valuation effects of IV termination depend on a number of contingencies. The fact that IV
termination adversely affects firms in some settings while venture termination can actually enhance firm value in
some well-defined contexts illustrates the value of taking a more constructive, contingency-based view of the
phenomenon. For example, the impact of many contingencies on a firm's abnormal returns from JV termination will
depend on whether the firm expands its boundary and control over the business through JV internalization or reduces
its commitment to the activity through JV withdrawal. This finding also highlights the importance of disaggregating
JV termination modes in theoretical and empirical research rather than treating IV instability as an undifferentiated
concept.
The empirical results indicate transaction cost theory aids in identifying many factors influencing firms'
abnormal returns from IV internalization and IV withdrawal. This study relaxes the selection approach used in
transaction cost analyses of the multinational firm and market entry by investigating firms' post-entry investment
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decisions and the performance effects of these choices. Just as standard transactional attributes and the broader
context of exchange affect firms' market entry decisions, these factors influence the performance implications of N
termination, depending on the way in which the venture ends. For example, abnormal returns from N
internalization are larger when the acquiring firm is R&D intensive, the acquiring firm has other on-going ventures
with the partner, and the N operates in a culturally similar host country with low investment risks. By contrast,
these contingencies either negatively or insignificantly influence the firm's abnormal returns from N withdrawal.
Since transaction cost theory has been a prominent paradigm used to study multinational firms and their
market entry decisions, the results of this study can be compared to earlier findings in this body of research. For
example, consistent with prior research reporting R&D intensity is positively associated with the firm's subsidiary
ownership and control (e.g., Fagre & Wells, 1982; Stopford & Wells, 1972) and the gains from international
acquisitions (Morck & Yeung, 1992), the parent firm's R&D intensity is positively related to abnormal returns from
JV internalization and negatively related to abnormal returns from N withdrawal.
Results for the firm's marketing-based intangible resources are more equivocal, however. Advertising
intensity has no bearing on the firm valuation effects of N internalization and, if anything, advertising intensity is
positively associated with abnormal returns from N withdrawal (p<O.lO). The results therefore indicate the firm's
technology-based intangible resources better explain firms' performance outcomes from N ownership changes.
Hennart (1991) similarly finds advertising intensity does not discriminate the entry mode choices of Japanese firms
entering the u.S. market, perhaps because cultural differences limit the usefulness of such resources in foreign
markets. Morek and Yeung (1992) also report advertising intensity does not explain firms' ex ante gains from
international expansion through acquisitions.
The venture's know-how requirements, as proxied by its industry context, also does not affect parent firms'
gains or losses from N termination. Whether or not the venture operates in a natural resource-based manufacturing
industry does not influence parent firms' abnormal returns from N ownership changes. Hence, while Ns may be
appropriate governance structures in such industry contexts due to lower know-how contributions required of parent
firms (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991), firms do not appear to suffer from acquiring complete control over
such ventures when governance structures offering less control might suffice. Neither do firms gain from acquiring
JVs in other industries demanding more complex know-how contributions by parent firms.
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Prior research on IV instability reports IV buttressed by other alliances between parent firms tend to survive
longer than isolated JVs (Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996). This study finds that the effects such supporting
ventures have upon IV termination depend on the means by which the focal venture ends. The presence of on-going
ventures upon IV withdrawal can reduce the firm's abnormal returns, though the negative spillovers associated with
venture withdrawal may not exist if the venture operates in a foreign market. By contrast, abnormal returns from IV
internalization tend to be higher when other on-going ventures exist between parent firms. Parent firms are likely to
make transaction-specific investments to such ventures and the presence of other alliances may ease the transition
process from venture to wholly-owned subsidiary since the acquiring firm can influence the selling firm through on-
going relationships. Future research might investigate how multiple relationships between firms affect the content of
exchange in a focal venture or how control changes in a venture affect other relationships between firms.
Consistent with past research noting cultural distance negatively influences subsidiary ownership and
control (e.g., Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Kogut & Singh, 1988) and gains
from international acquisitions (e.g., Datta & Puia, 1995), this study finds cultural distance between the U.S. and the
JV's host country negatively affects the firm's abnormal returns from the more incremental step of acquiring an
international venture. Abnormal returns from acquiring control over an IIV through venture internalization are lower
when the IV operates in the Far East or in Latin European countries relative to Anglo nations (after controlling for
host country political risks and other conditions). This contrasts Gatignon and Anderson's (1988) finding that U.S.
MNCs~ preferences are more oriented against complete subsidiary ownership in Germanic and Latin American
countries. The present research also finds cultural distance has no apparent impact on the abnormal returns from IV
withdrawal. None of the six indicator variables for national culture clusters takes on a significant positive sign and
the weighted index measure of cultural distance measure is insignificant.
The empirical results do no provide conclusive evidence regarding the focal firm's international experience.
While multinational experience has been found to promote the use of wholly-owned subsidiaries (e.g., Gatignon &
Anderson, 1988), such experience has no bearing on firms' abnormal returns from IV internalization. Multinational
experience also does not affect firms' abnormal returns from IV withdrawal. Prior research suggests experience in a
particular host country supports complete ownership (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1989) and can facilitate greater market
commitment through stand-alone operations (e.g., Beamish & Inkpen, 1995). However, firms with direct
investments in the host country prior to IV internalization experienced lower abnormal returns from IV
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internalization than firms with no such local experience. The negative effect a prior entry has on the abnormal
returns from IV internalization may reflect diminishing marginal returns from subsequent entries into the host
country, but the dichotomous nature of the variable did not permit testing possible nonlinearities in the relationship.
As hypothesized, firms lacking local experience obtained from a prior entry obtained higher abnormal returns from
IV withdrawal than firms with prior direct investments in the host market.
Just as host country political risk affects firms'market entry choices, political risk in the venture's host
country at the time of IV internalization or IV withdrawal influences parent firm performance. Previous research
finds a negative relationship between political risk and subsidiary control. For instance, firms turn to licensing
agreements over IIVs and wholly-owned subsidiaries in high risk countries (e.g., Kim & Hwang, 1992), and financial
transfer risks prompt firms to use franchising agreements over direct investments (Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque,
1995). The present research shows fmns' abnormal returns from IV internalization tend to be lower when the
venture operates in a country subject to investment restriction risks, and firms' abnormal returns from IV withdrawal
are larger when the host country is undergoing political turmoil. Collectively these findings illustrate the value of
directly examining firms' post-entry investment decisions and the performance consequences for parent fmns using
the transaction cost lens.
Beyond the study's implications for IV research and transaction cost theory in general, a number of
opportunities for future research and limitations are evident. First, research might examine other types of alliances to
assess the generalizability of the present findings. This study focused entirely on equity joint ventures with at least
one U.S. parent firm. Second, future research might extend this study by investigating other types of alliance
evolution and instability, examining how parent firms might adapt alliance governance structures without terminating
the collaborative relationship. Research along these lines would also benefit from incorporating other parent firm
outcomes since event study methodology is suitable for studying discrete shifts in firms' ownership positions rather
than more gradual changes in control structures. This study is also limited by its use of available secondary data, an
approach that helps characterize parent firms and ventures' environments, but does so at the cost of neglecting
micro-level alliance features that might be more fully examined through primary data obtained from surveys or
clinical studies. Finally, alternative theoretical perspectives could extend this research by identifying other




1 See Anderson (1990); Brown, Rugman, and Verbeke (1989); Dymsza (1988); Killing (1983); Parkhe (1991); Ring
and Van de Ven (1994); and Spekman et al. (1996).
2 Studies include Barkema, Bell, and Pennings (1996); Kogut (1988a, 1989); Li (1995); Park and Russo (1996); and
Pennings, Barkema, and Douma (1994).
3 See Anderson and Gatignon (1986); Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992); Gatignon and Anderson (1988); Gomes-
Casseres (1989, 1990); Hennart (1991); Hennart and Park (1994); Hill, Hwang, and Kim (1992); Kim and Hwang
(1992); Osborn and Baughn (1990); and Pisano (1989), among others.
4 For testing whether an average abnormal return or cumulative abnormal return is different from zero, ARs or CARs
require standardization. Following Patel1 (1976), the standardized abnormal return can be expressed as SARit =
A~ , where Si is an estimate of the standard deviation of the residuals during the estimation period (i.e.,
SjVCjt
Ts~ = i(Rjj - (aj + bjRmj »2 / (Tj - 2), Ti being the number of data points in the estimation interval for firm i) and Citj=l
is the standard econometric adjustment for forecasts outside an estimation interval (i.e.,
T
Cit =1+ (1 / Tj) + [(R mt - Rm)2 / i(Rmj - Rm)2] , where Rm is the average market return in the estimation interval.
j=1
Using the central limit theorem, the average standardized abnormal return, ASARt , is asymptotically normally
distributed with mean zero and variance lIN, so hypothesis testing can be performed on the statistic .IN. ASARt -
N(O,I). Similarly, the standardized cumulative abnormal return can be calculated as
CSARj.t.IC =(1I..[d) fAR jl / (SjJC:), where d equals the number of days abnormal returns are summed (i.e., d =l(
I=t
- or + I). The mean standardized cumulative abnormal return, CASAR, can be.calculated for a sample of N firms
and, under the central limit theorem, hypothesis testing can be performed on the statistic .IN. CASAR - N(O,I).
Standardization is also one remedial measure for heteroskedastic error terms result when CARs are used as
dependent variables in regression models.
26
REFERENCES
Agarwal, S., & Ramaswami, S. N. 1992. Choice of foreign market entry mode: Impact of ownership,
location, and internalization factors. Journal oflnternational Business Studies, 23: 1-27.
Anderson, E. 1990. Two firms, one frontier: On assessing joint venture performance. Sloan Management Review,
31: 19-30.
Anderson, E., & Gatignon, H. 1986. Modes of foreign entry: A transaction cost analysis and propositions. Journal of
International Business Studies, 17: 1-26.
Ansoff, H. I. 1965. Corporate strategy: An analytical approach to business policy for growth and expansion. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Balakrishnan, S., & Koza, M. P. 1993. Information asymmetry, adverse selection, and joint ventures. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 20: 99-117.
Barkema, H. G., Bell, J. H. J., & Pennings, J. M. 1996. Foreign entry, cultural barriers, and learning. Strategic
Management Journal, 17: 151-166.
Beamish, P. W. 1985. The characteristics of joint ventures in developed and developing countries. Columbia Journal
of World Business, 20; 13-19.
Beamish, P. W., & Banks, J. C. 1987. Equity joint ventures and the theory of the multinational enterprise. Journal of
International Business Studies, 18: 1-16.
Beamish, P. W., & Inkpen, A. C. 1995. Keeping international joint ventures stable and profitable. Long Range
Planning, 28: 26-36.
Belsey, D. A., Kuh, E., & Welsch, R. E. 1980. Regression diagnostics. New York, NY: Wiley.
Berg, S. V., & Friedman, P. 1978. Joint ventures in American industry. Mergers and Acquisitions, 13: 28-41.
Blodgett, L. L. 1991. Partner contributions as predictors of equity share in international joint ventures. Journal of
International Business Studies, 22: 63-78.
Blodgett, L. L. 1992. Factors in the instability of international joint ventures: An event history analysis. Strategic
Management Journal, 13: 475-491.
Brown, L. T., Rugman, A. M., & Verbeke, A. 1989. Japanese joint ventures with Western multinational:
Synthesizing the economic and cultural explanations of failure. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 6:
225-242.
Caves, R. E. 1996. Multinational enterprise and economic analysis (Second Edition). New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Caves, R. E., & Mehra, S. K. 1986. Entry of foreign multinationals into U.S. manufacturing industries. In Porter, M.
E. (Ed.), Competition in global industries: 449-481. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Chen, H., Hu, M. Y., & Shieh, J. C. P. 1991. The wealth effect of international joint ventures: The case of U. S.
investment in China. Financial Management, 20: 31-41.
Chung, I. Y., Koford, K. 1., & Lee, I. 1993. Stock market views of corporate multinationalism: Some evidence from
announcements of international joint ventures. Ouarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 33: 275-293.
27
Contractor, F. J. 1990. Ownership patterns of U. S. joint ventures abroad and the liberalization of foreign
government regulations in the 1980s: Evidence from the benchmark surveys. Journal of International
Business Studies, 21: 55-73.
Crutchley, C. E., Guo, E., & Hansen, R. S. 1991. Stockholder benefits from Japanese-U.S. joint ventures. Financial
Management, 20: 22-30.
Datta, D. K., & Puia, G. 1995. Cross-border acquisitions: An examination of the influence of relatedness and cultural
fit on shareholder value creation in U.S. acquiring firms. Management International Review, 35: 327-359.
Davidson, W. 1980. The location offoreign direct investment activity: Country characteristics and experience
effects. Journal of International Business Studies, 11: 9-22.
Davidson, W. H., & McFetridge, D. G. 1985. Key characteristics in the choice of international technology transfer
mode. Journal ofInternational Business Studies, 16: 5-21.
Davies, H. 1977. Technology transfer through commercial transactions. Journal ofIndustrial Economics, 26: 161-
175.
Doz, Y. L. 1996. The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial conditions or learning processes?
Strategic Management Journal, 17 (Summer Special Issue): 55-84.
Dunning, J. H. 1988. The eclectic paradigm of international production: A restatement and some possible extensions.
Journal ofInternational Business Studies, 19: 1-31.
Dymsza, W. A. 1988. Successes and failures of joint ventures in developing countries: Lessons from experience. In
Contractor, F. J., & Lorange, P. (Eds.), Cooperative strategies in international business: 403-424.
Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
Erramilli, M. K. 1991. The experience factor in foreign market entry behavior of service firms. Journal of
International Business Studies, 22: 479-501.
Fagre, N., & Wells, L. T. 1982. Bargaining power of multinationals and host governments. Journal of International
Business Studies, 11: 9-23.
Finnerty, 1. E., Owers, 1. E., & Rogers, R. C. 1986. The valuation impact of joint ventures. Management
International Review, 26: 14-26.
Fitzpatrick, M. 1983. The definition and assessment of political risk in international business: A review of the
literature. Academy of Management Review, 8: 249-254.
Fladmoe-Lindquist, K., & Jacque, L. L. 1995. Control modes in international service operations: The propensity to
franchise. Management Science, 41: 1238-1249.
Fox, J. 1991. Regression diagnostics. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Franko, L. G. 1971. Joint venture divorce in the multinational company. Columbia Journal of World Business, 6: 13-
22.
Franko, L. G. 1989. Use of minority and 50-50 joint ventures by United States multinationals during the 1970s: The
interaction of host country policies and corporate strategies. Journal of International Business Studies, 20:
19-40.
28
Gatignon, H., & Anderson, E. 1988. The multinational corporation degree of control over subsidiaries: An empirical
test of a transaction cost explanation. Journal of Law. Economics. and Organization, 4: 305-336.
Gomes-Casseres, B. 1987. Joint venture instability: Is it a problem? Columbia Journal of World Business, 22: 97-
102.
Gomes-Casseres, B. 1989. Ownership structures offoreign subsidiaries: Theory and evidence. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 11: 1-25.
Gomes-Casseres, B. 1990. Firm ownership preferences and host government restrictions: An integrated approach.
Journal ofinternational Business Studies, 21: 1-22.
Gupta, A., McGowan, Jr., C. B., Misra, L., & Missirian, A. 1991. Gains from corporate multinationalism: Evidence
from the China experience. The Financial Review, 26: 387-407.
Hamel, G. 1991. Competition for competence and interpartner learning within international strategic alliances.
Strategic Management Journal, 12: 83-103.
Harrigan, K. R. 1988. Strategic alliances and partner asymmetries in international business. In Contractor, F. J., &
Lorange, P. (Eds.), Cooperative strategies in international business: 205-226. Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books.
Harrigan, K. R., & Newman, W. H. 1990. Bases of interorganization cooperation: propensity, power, persistence.
Journal of Management Studies, 4: 417-434.
Hennart, J.-F. 1982. A theory of multinational entemrise. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Hennart, J.-F. 1989. Can the "new forms" of investment substitute for the "old forms?" A transaction cost
perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 19: 211-234.
Hennart, J.-F. 1991. The transaction costs theory of joint ventures: An empirical study of Japanese subsidiaries in the
United States. Management Science, 37: 483-497.
Hennart, J.-F., & Park, Y. R. 1994. Location, governance, and strategic determinants of Japanese manufacturing
investment in the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 15: 419-436.
Hill, C. W. L., Hwang, P., & Kim, M. C. 1990. An eclectic theory of the choice of international entry mode.
Strategic Management Journal, 11: 117-128.
Hofstede, G. 1980. Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Hoskisson, R. E., Johnson, R. A., & Moese!. 1994. Corporate divestiture intensity in restructuring firms: Effects of
governance, strategy, and performance. Academy of Management Journal, 37: 1207-1251.
Hu, M. Y., Chen, H., & Shieh, J. C. 1992. Impact of U.S.-China joint ventures on stockholders' wealth by degree of
international involvement. Management International Review, 32: 135-149.
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J. E. 1977. The internationalization process of a firm: A model of knowledge development
and increasing foreign market commitments. Journal of International Business Studies, 9: 22-32.
Killing, J. 1983. Strategies for joint venture success. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Kim, M. c., & Hwang, P. 1992. Global strategy and multinationals' entry mode choice. Journal of International
Business Studies, 23: 29-53.
29
Klein, B., Crawford, R. A., & Alchian, A. A. 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive
contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21: 297-326.
Kobrin, S. J. 1982. Managing political risk assessment. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Kogut, B. 1988a. A study in the life cycles of joint ventures. In Contractor, F. 1., & Lorange, P. (Eds.), Cooperative
strategies in international business: 169-185. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
Kogut, 1988b. Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Strategic Management Journal, 9: 319-332.
Kogut, B. 1989. The stability of joint ventures: Reciprocity and competitive rivalry. Journal of Industrial Economics,
9: 319-332.
Kogut, 1991. Joint ventures and the option to acquire and expand. Management Science, 37: 19-33.
Kogut, B., & Singh, H. 1988. The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal of International
Business Studies, 19: 411-432.
Koh, 1., & Venkatraman, N. 1991. Joint venture formations and stock market reactions: An assessment of the
information technology sector. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 869-892.
Lee, I., & Wyatt, S. B. 1990. The effects of international joint ventures on shareholder wealth. The Financial
Review, 25: 641-649.
Levy, D. T. 1984. The transaction cost approach to vertical integration: An empirical examination. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 66: 438-445.
Li, 1. 1995. Foreign entry and survival: Effects of strategic choices on performance in international markets.
Strategic Management Journal, 16: 333-351.
Lummer, S. L., & McConnell, J. 1. 1990. Stock valuation effects of international joint ventures. In Rhee, S. G., &
Chang, R. P. (Eds.), Pacific basin capital market research: 531-546. North-Holland: Elsevier Science
Publishers B. V.
Madhavan, R., & Prescott, 1. E. 1995. Market value impact of joint ventures: The effect of industry information-
processing load. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 900-915.
McConnell, J. J., & Nantell, T. J. 1985. Corporate combinations and common stock returns: The case of joint
ventures. Journal of Finance, 40: 519-536.
McWilliams, A. & Siegel, D. 1997. Event studies in management research: Theoretical and empirical issues.
Academy of Management Journal, 40: 626-657.
Morek, R., & Yeung, B. 1992. Internalization: An event study test. Journal oflnternational Economics, 33: 41-56.
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. 1990. Applied linear statistical models. Homewood, IL: Irwin.
Osborn, R. N., & Baughn, C. C. 1990. Forms of interorganizational governance for multinational alliances. Academy
of Management Journal, 33: 503-519.
Park, S. H., & Russo, M. V. 1996. When competition eclipses cooperation: An event history analysis of joint venture
failure. Management Science, 42: 875-890.
30
Parkhe, A. 1991. Interfirm diversity, organizational learning, and longevity in global strategic alliances. Journal of
International Business Studies, 22: 579-601.
Patell, J. N. 1976. Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior: Empirical tests. Journal of
Accounting Research, 14: 246-276.
Pennings,1. M., Barkema, H., & Douma, S. 1994. Organization learning and diversification. Academy of
Management Journal, 37: 608-640.
Pisano, G. P. 1989. Using equity participation to support exchange: Evidence from the biotechnology industry.
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 5: 109-126.
Reynolds, J. I. 1979. India-American joint ventures: Business policy relationships. Washington, DC: University
Press of America.
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. 1994. Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships.
Academy of Management Review, 19: 90-118.
Riordan, M. H., & Williamson, O. E. 1985. Asset specificity and economic organization. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 3: 365-378.
Ronen, S., & Shenkar, O. 1985. Clustering countries on attitudinal dimensions; A review and synthesis. Academy of
Management Review, 10: 435-454.
Root, F. R. 1987. Entry strategies for international markets (Revised ed.). New York: Lexington Books.
Shelanski, H. A., & Klein, P. G. 1995. Empirical research in transaction cost economics: A review and assessment.
Journal of Law. Economics, and Organization, 11: 335-361.
Spekman, R. E., Isabella, L. A., MacAvoy, T. c., & Forbes, T. 1996. Creating strategic alliances which endure.
Long Range Planning, 29: 346-357.
Spiller, P. T. 1985. On vertical mergers. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1: 285-312.
Stickel, S. E. 1985. The effect of Value Line Investment Survey rank changes on common stock prices. Journal of
Financial Economics, 14: 121 -143.
Stopford, J. M., & Wells, L. T. 1972. Managing the multinational entemrise. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Stuckey, J. A. 1983. Vertical integration and joint ventures in the aluminum industry. Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press.
Teece, D. 1. 1986. Transaction cost economics and the multinational enterprise: An assessment. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 7: 21-45.
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. 1988. Technology and transaction cost economics: A reply. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 10: 355-363.
Williamson, O. E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives.
Administrative Science Ouarterly, 36: 269-296.
Williamson, O. E. 1992. Markets, hierarchies, and the modern corporation: An unfolding perspective. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 17: 335-352.
31
Williamson, O. E. 1993. The logic of economic organization. In Williamson, O. E., & Winter, S. G. (Eds.), The
nature of the firm: 90-116. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Woolridge, 1. R., & Snow, C. C. 1990. Stock market reaction to strategic investment decisions. Strategic
Management Journal, 11: 353-363.
Zaheer, S., & Mosakowski, E. 1997. The dynamics of the liability of foreignness: A global study of survival in
financial services. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 439-464.
32
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix8
Variable Mean s.d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) CARi ._2,2 ***.578 5.953 .089 .030 -.034 .032 -.343 -.010 -.052
(2) R&D .095 .582 -.015 .267* -.132 .042 -.278** .383***-.087
(3) ADV .024 .055 -.084 .881 *** --- .058 -.053 -.364*** .053 .004
(4) NATRES .153 .360 .002 -.061 .058 -.121 .020 .081 .179*
(5) TIES .158 .364 -.119 -.061 -.053 -.121 .324*** .012 .036
(6) LASSET 8.055 2.228 -.164* -.340***-.364*** .020 .324*** --- -.071 .007
(7) EQUITY .494 .092 .032 .022 .053 .081 .012 -.071 -.006
(8) DURATION 9.019 8.671 .055 -.083 .004 .179* .036 .007 -.006
aMeans and standard deviations are for N internalizations and N withdrawals. Reported correlations are
Pearson coefficients. Correlations above the diagonal are for N internalizations, and correlations below the
diagonal are for N withdrawals. Cell sizes range from 68 to 116 for N internalizations and 103 to 182 for N
withdrawals. t p < 0.10, * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix:
International Joint Venturesb
Variable Mean s.d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
(1) CAR i..2.2 .44 5.98 --- -.17 -.09 -.03 -.08 .07 -.09 .03 -.20t -.08 -.11 -.01 -.11 .15 -.13 -.07 -.27* -.06 -.01
(2) CO 1.60 1.10 .13 --- .40*** -.30** .40*** -.11 .50*** .06 .18 .05 .17 .13 .27* -.23* .22t .47*** .10 .04 .08
(3) FAREAST .07 .25 -.01 .29** --- -.09 -.07 -.14 -.13 -.13 .11 -.08 -.03 -.10 -.04 -.08 -.28** .53*** .18t .04 -.12
(4) GERMANIC .06 .24 -.05 -.17t -.04 --- -.08 -.17 -.16 -.16 -.12 -.11 .001 -.11 -.15 -.10 .09 .02 ".13 -.05 .22*
(5) LATINAM .06 .23 .12 .24* -.05 -.04 --- -.12 -.12 -.12 -.03 -.04 .44*** .35*** .36*** -.07 -.21 t -.05 .04 -.08 .03
(6) LATINEUR .16 .37 -.11 -.19t -.10 -.07 -.09 --- -.24* -.24* -.08 .10 .15 .05 -.15 -.15 -.07 -.03 -.14 -.22* -.19t
(7) JAPAN .25 .43 .02 .58*** -.17t -.11 -.15 -.30** --- -.23* .18 .25* - -.24* -.20t -.001 -.03 .58*** .16 -.11 .18t .33**
(8) OTHER .20 .40 .08 .04 -.12 -.09 -.11 -.22* -.36*** --- .02 -.29** .10 .40*** .15 -.03 -.43*** -.36*** .26* .12 -.23*
(9) MULT 14.54 11.63 -.15 .08 -.06 -.10 -.06 -.12 .18t .06 --- .42*** -.12 -.03 -.12 -.10 .13 .02 .44* .09 .22*
(10) PRIOR .53 .50 -.23* -.24* -.12 .15 -.17t -.04 .09 -.17t .46*** --- -.17 -.17 -.05 .05 .31** -.01 .12 -.04 .15
(11) TURMOIL 1.21 .46 .13 .17 -.11 -.08 .27** -.09 -.32*** .60*** .03 -.25** --- .62*** .73*** -.15 -.21 * .002 .15 -.03 -.15
(12) TRANSFER .59 .66 .07 .23* -.04 -.15 .27** -.10 -.28** .56*** .09 -.24* .82*** --- .53*** -.09 -.32** -.37*** .26* .03 -.19t
(13) INVRST .50 .49 .13 .26* -.06 -.15 .26** -.26** -.14 .50*** -.02 -.28** .82*** .81*** --- -.01 -.04 .01 .03 .03 -.06
(14) TIES .14 .34 -.07 -.04 .01 -.08 .01 .06 -.03 .09 .35*** .20* .06 .16 .09 --- -.05 -.07 .04 .09 -.10
(15) GOP 1.26E6 l.1E6 -.01 .43*** -.26** -.04 -.21 * -.16t .59*** -.46*** .14 .11 -.38*** -.37** *-.21 * -.06 --- .12 -.18t .12 .39***
(16) GOPGR 3.18 2.39 .02 .33*** .46*** -.07 -.10 -.22* .12 -.04 .12 -.02 -.003 -.01 -.16 .07 .01 --- -.03 -.05 .15
(17) LASSET 8.30 2.07 -.19t -.11 -.02 -.10 .06 -.04 -.09 .11 .48*** .27** .13 .14 .01 .37*** -.14 .24* --- .15 .02
(18) EQUITY .49 .09 .04 .02 .11 .06 -.04 -.02 .05 -.08 .06 -.03 -.09 -.02 .001 .05 .07 .08 -.01 --- -.03
(19) OURATIONIO.33 9.28 .09 .08 -.14 -.07 -.06 -.14 .24* -.02 .19t .14 -.06 -.08 -.04 .08 .21* .06 -.09 -.05
bMeans and standard deviations are for JV internalizations and JV withdrawals. Reported correlations are Pearson coefficients. Correlations above the diagonal are for
JV internalizations, and correlations below the diagonal are for JV withdrawals. Sample sizes for the matrix elements range from 70 to 86 for JV internalizations and 99 to 109 for
JV withdrawals. t p < 0.10, * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001.
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TABLE 3
Average Shareholder Wealth Effects of Joint Venture TerminationC
Mean Abnormal Percentage Returns, AARt (%), for Joint Venture Termination Type:
Date (t) I II III IV V
-5 -0.139 0.035 0.703 0.136 0.296
-4 0.057 -0.019 -0.223 0.388 0.041
-3 -0.001 0.092 -0.558 1.204 -0.139
-2 -0.311 -0.267 0.047 -0.908 0.188
-1 0.511 0.323 -0.347 0.457 0.205
0 0.434 0.177 1.384** -0.192 0.067
0.053 0.209t -0.393 -1.314t -0.023
2 -0.023 0.154 0.434 -0.063· -0.246
3 -0.082 O.077t 0.113 -0.774t -0.210
4 0.419 -0.297 -0.385 0.430 -0.107
5 -0.202 0.149 -0.369 1.950 -0.295
N 139 168 14 19 29
c Significance levels are based on average standardized abnormal returns:
t p < 0.10
* P < 0.05
** P < 0.01
*** P < 0.001
Key to the Joint Venture Termination Types:
I: Focai firm internalizes the JV.
II: Focal firm sells its JV equity stake to its partner(s).
III: Focal firm sells is JV equity stake to an outside party.
IV: Focal firm and its partner(s) sell the JV to an outside party.
V: Focal firm and its partner(s) liquidate the JV's assets.
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TABLE 4
Results of Multiple Regression Analysesd


















Model F-value 3.265** 1.457
R-square 0.352 0.117
N 50 85
d Standard errors appear in parentheses.
t p < 0.10
* P < 0.05




Results of Multiple Regression Analyses:
International Joint Ventures·
Explanatory Joint Venture Internalizations Joint Venture Withdrawals
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept .017 (.044) .039 (.036) -.042 (.068) -.060 (.054)
CD -.008 (.004)t .004 (.007)
FAREAST -.078 (.024)** .028 (.030)
GERMANIC -.002 (.020) -.008 (.026)
LATINAM -.016 (.024) -.061 (.030)*
LATINEUR -.032 (.016)* -.016 (.017)
JAPAN .047 (.042) .002 (.041)
OTHER -.025 (.018) .014 (.022)
MULT .0003 (.0005) -.0003 (.0006) -.0002 (.001) -.0001 (.001)
PRIOR -.028 (.011)* -.006 (.011) -.017 (.013) -.022 (.012)t
TURMOIL -.017 (.016) -.018 (.020) .056 (.033)t .053 (.029)t
TRANSFER .011 (.011) .019 (.011) -.017 (.018) -.013 (.017)
INVRST -.011 (.014) -.035 (.018)t -.010 (.024) -.008 (.025)
TIES .047 (.014)** .027 (.015)t -.002 (.014) .002 (.012)
GDP 3.3E-9 (1E-8) -2.7E-8 (2E-8) -1.8E-9 (1E-8) -3.5E-9 (2E-8)
GDPGR .004 (.003) .007 (.002)** -.005 (.004) -.008 (.003)*
LASSET .0005 (.003) .004 (.003) -.002 (.004) .003 (.003)
EQUITY -.038 (.067) -.049 (.056) .041 (.097) .040 (.076)
DURATION .002 (.001)* .0001 (.0008) .001 (.001) .001 (.001)
Model F-value 2.493* 2.074* 1.429 1.506
R-square 0.410 0.414 0.211 0.286
N 56 68 77 82
e Standard errors appear in parentheses.
t p < 0.10
* P < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** P < 0.001
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